I Introduction
Starting from the eighties, literature on Roman law focusing on the period between the second century BC and the second century AD has shown that businesses could be organized as a plurium exercitio negotiationum per servos. More generally, this format included a slave, in some cases coowned, 1 and the assets entrusted to him by his masters (the peculium), 2 with which the slave managed a business. This way of organizing individual or collective enterprises 3 had some advantages over the mere partnership contract (societas consensus contracta), 4 the most remarkable of which was an indirect way to achieve limited liability 5 and direct agency. (1984) , 386 (emphasizing that the most distinctive feature of this format was the possibility to organize both individual and collective limitedliability enterprises by means of the peculium.). A. Di Porto, 'Il diritto commerciale romano. Una 'zona d'ombra' nella storiografia romanistica e nelle riflessioni storico-comparative dei commercialisti', in S. Romano (ed.), Nozione, formazione e interpretazione del diritto dall'età romana alle esperienze moderne. Ricerche dedicate al prof. F. Gallo (1997), vol. 3, 421-422 (emphasizing that the fundamental elements of the organizational modes of businesses through the use of slaves are independent of the fact that the slave and the peculium were co-owned. In fact, co-ownership only added a layer of complexity to the business structure without affecting its characteristics in terms of liability and governance modern notions of economic organizations fall short of considering very significant differences in the respective legal systems, economic and technological development, and economic thinking. 8 In light of these differences, we ground the analysis exclusively on those features of slave-run businesses that are discussed in the writings of Roman jurists, who identified a set of problems arising in connection with slave-run businesses and proposed solutions to them.
It has recently been observed that "there is still ample room for studying in more detail, and through an analysis specifically oriented by the conceptualizations of the New Institutionalism, both the emergence and the diffusion of what we may call Roman commercial law: (…) the effects of the rules which govern the relationship between principal and agent". 9 Accordingly we use modern economic theory only to unveil the economic nature of the problems addressed and of their solutions and to shed light on their effects on the configuration of slave-run businesses. In doing so, we draw functional parallels between ancient and modern solutions to similar problems. We do not assert that there is a link between modern economic institutions and the ancient institutions we analyze nor do we claim that modern and ancient institutions can be compared or juxtaposed without taking into account the different contexts in which they operated.
We employ modern techniques borrowed from the economic analysis of law in order to examine the problems discussed and the solutions proposed by Roman jurists. 10 Economic analysis allows us to identify the mechanisms at work in ancient businesses and to explain both why some solutions were successful in addressing those problems and what were the limitations of these solutions. The use of economic analysis is justified by the fact that the problems discussed have a marked economic nature since they refer, as we explain, to situations in which there was asymmetric information or moral hazard.
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Therefore, we do not claim that the Roman jurists described the problems we discuss and their solutions in the same terms used in twenty-first-century economics. 12 Nevertheless, the jurists used their experience with the practice of law to propose solutions that helped address these problems. on some relevant facts on which the principal is not informed), which generates adverse selection. A different problem is related to hidden action (the agent's actions cannot be observed by the principal), which in turn generates moral hazard. For instance, a debtor may have better information than the creditor on his ability to repay (hidden information) or on the actions he is taking in order to improve such ability (hidden action). Asymmetric information is costly in two ways: it may induce the parties to forego some dealings that with complete information would have been profitable or it may require costly monitoring of the agent's activities by the principal. The framework offered by agency theory is flexible: the roles of agent and principal can be assigned to the various individuals involved in or dealing with a business organization so that different relationships can be brought under the same analytical framework by carefully defining roles and information asymmetries. Slave-run businesses may have been small in the sense that they involved a limited number of individuals or in the sense that they employed limited amounts of capital. 18 We argue that economic importance is only a secondary factor affecting these two aspects of the size of these businesses.
First-order effects are produced by the inherent characteristics of such business organizations and their relations to the markets in which they operate. A business organization is a governance institution for economic activities, some of which could alternatively take place in the market. and access to equity, respectively. Access to both forms of capital depends not only on the existence of a capital market external to the business organization but also on the possibility to tackle the principal-agent problems arising between owners and creditors in addition to the principal-agent problems arising among owners, which we examine in terms of internal governance. While the former limited the owners' ability to finance their enterprises through credit, the latter impeded their commit of own capital. Principal-agent problems among owners
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Principal-agent problems among slaves response to agency problems and the available technology to solve these problems. 24 This development took the form of specific solutions, which were commented upon by the jurists Gaius and Ulpian, often quoting Julian. These jurists-and to a certain extend also the jurist Paul-offered solutions to some recurring legal problems. By systematically analyzing both the problems presented and their solutions, we are able to identify several specific agency problems, of which the Roman jurists were most likely not aware. an enormous amount of literature in economics. 25 We do not claim that Roman jurists examined these problems in a modern fashion. Cf master's liability increase in accordance with his involvement in the businesses. 31 The praetorian remedies de facto made the contracts concluded by a slave enforceable against his master(s), under certain conditions. This development crucially improved the willingness of third parties to rely on the slaves' commitments to repay debts and honor the obligations contracted and, in turn, made it easier for masters to delegate economic activities to their slaves. 32 Moreover, although in a radically different way, this format exhibited some characteristics that are common in modern business entities. 33 Furthermore, the use of slaves (as opposed to free individuals) as business managers 34 could mitigate the governance problems arising between owners and management, 35 while the possibility for the slave-manager to purchase slaves of his own allowed for a hierarchical structure with different levels of management. 36 Against this background, we explain why slave-run businesses involved limited numbers of individuals and limited capital.
II Methodology
The problem we discuss in this article interacts with several other issues that, in turn, are controversial and much debated, such as a modernist versus primitivist view of ancient economies, the chronology of actiones adiecticiae qualitatis and of the obligationes naturales servorum, the formulary structure of the actiones, the legal capacity to own assets of individuals alieni iuris, the coexistence of partnership and co-ownership, and the importance of accounting techniques for a distinction between rationes servi and ratio dominica. Our aim is not to provide a solution to each of these issues; rather our analysis has a more limited scope and focuses on the economic factors that had an effect in shaping the characteristics of the negotiationes per servos communes. As it has been frequently observed, any attempt to provide a model of reality faces the challenge of isolating few important variables. 37 In doing so, one necessarily foregoes some nuances in the hope of being able to draw a broader and analytically more powerful picture. In doing so, we have tried to take into careful account the complex interactions between data and their possible interpretations, as any legal historical analysis requires.
The literature on this topic has traditionally been focused on two main interpretations of the phenomenon we analyze. Part of the literature recognizes the advantages of slave-run businesses over other organizational forms, such as partnerships, and stresses the fact that they allowed for a better management of the risks deriving both from shifts in profitability and from exposure to liabilities. Others, without denying these potential advantages, have emphasized the limited scope of this phenomenon both in terms of capital employed and in terms of individuals involved. While the first view only looks at the advantages and overlooks the costs of such business organizations, the second view relates size to importance without providing a clear explanation as to why economic importance could have acted as a constraint and implicitly suggesting that size was "pathologically" limited. Our approach could be situated at the interface of previous theories as we try to relate costs and benefits of business organization based on the employment of (possibly coowned) slave managers and show that such businesses where "physiologically" small. That is, we suggest that the observed size was a result of forces operating both internally (organization cost related to governance) and externally (transactions costs related to access to credit) and was not necessarily related to the economic importance of this phenomenon.
Understanding the interplay between transaction costs and organizational costs means addressing questions as to the optimal boundaries, scope, legal configuration, and size of business organizations and has been a challenge for economists since the seventies. Three theories come to the fore: The property rights theory of the firm stresses the optimal use of available resources; instead, the bundled assignability theory of the firm, emphasizes the optimal transfer of resources; 39 finally, the agency theory focuses on the conflicts of interests arising within the firm and with creditors. 40 The property rights and bundled assignability theories provide fundamental tools for a mature understanding of the scope of business organizations and of the strategic choices involved,
as they explain what are the sets of activities are that will most likely be carried out within a business organization (boundaries of the firm) rather than through market exchange. However, for our purposes, the necessary building block for an economic perspective on ancient and modern businesses is an examination of the costs generated by the functioning of the organization both internally and in relation to its market counterparts (creditors). In this respect, agency theory plays a major role. Agency costs are the costs generated by the simple fact that the parties involved in a business organization will typically have different sources of information and hence information available to one party may not be available to another. This perspective provides guidance for our analysis.
III Governance problems
III.1 Governance problems
Agency costs may affect the relationships among the various individuals within the businessowners and (slave-)managers 41 -and act as a constraint on the expansion of the firm in terms of action. Although it is almost always impossible to write perfectly complete contracts, ex ante it is possible to allocate control rights, that is, the right to choose a course of action should an unforeseen contingency materialize. Accordingly, control rights are embedded in asset ownership; that is, the owner of an asset is the party holding control rights on the use of that asset. From this perspective, the firm is a bundle of assets under unified ownership, so that firm ownership confers the right to take decisions in residual cases (i.e. those cases not specified in a contract). The theory predicts that the party that makes the most important, non-contractible investments should hold control rights and hence ownership of the firm. In turn, ownership induces that party to make such investments and prevents the other party from free-riding on them. 39 This theory sees the firm as a bundle of contracts, whose value largely depends on the fact that they are bundled together. This theory stresses the importance of legal entities in assuring the bundled assignability of such contracts. By shedding light on such fundamental issues as property and contracts and explaining how they impact on business organizations, these theories provide fundamental insights on the nature and scope of business organizations. This approach has been proposed by K. 41 To simplify, for analytical purposes one can distinguish among three groups of individuals: owners, managers, and creditors. Agency problems arise both within the business organization (between owners and managers) and between the business organization and its creditors. Moreover, agency problems arise within each of these three groups of individuals; that is, among owners, within the management, and among creditors. The frictions created by agency problems amount to individuals involved. In the following, we focus on businesses run by slaves endowed with a peculium. We first analyze governance problems-the agency problems arising within the business organization-and show that they constrained the expansion of these business organizations in terms of the number of individuals involved. Then, we examine limited access to credit-mainly focusing on agency problems between business and creditors and among creditors-and emphasize that limited access to credit constrained the expansion of these business organizations in terms of amount of capital invested. In the next subsections, we review several types of such agency problems emerging from cases discussed in the sources and then examine the legal remedies offered to reduce them. Besides legal remedies, two other forces can also keep principal-agent problems under control: external market forces and internal monitoring by the principal. We will also review these two mechanisms and show that they faced limitations in the ancient Roman economy if compared to the legal remedies provided by the ius honorarium.
III.1.1 Agency problems among owners
A slave and possibly, but not necessarily, his peculium could either be owned by one master or be co-owned by several masters. 42 Co-owned slave-run businesses involving the use of the peculium show organizational patterns-of which we can find evidence in several texts in the Digesta 43 -featuring peculiar principal-agent problems related to the relationship among the various masters.
Since each master can take decisions that affect the others, each master is, in this sense, an agent of the others, who assume (for the purpose of the analysis) the role of principals. Each slaveowner has an interest in none of the others putting his own personal gain before the common good of the business. Obviously, the problem is reciprocal so that each slaveowners is both an agent (when he has hidden information or can take hidden actions) 44 and a principal (when another owner does so) of the others. Among the cases reported by legal sources we discuss those in which a master is in a organization costs and constrain the expansion of the firm both in terms of individuals involved in the organization and in terms of capital involved. 42 44 Hidden information refers to cases in which the agent has information concerning some relevant facts on which the master is not informed. In contrast, hidden action refers to cases in which the agent can take actions which affect the master but which the master cannot observe. See also Section I .
position to exploit private information or generate costs for the other masters by his own behavior.
A first source of agency problems is asymmetric information, arising from the fact that the masters could be differently informed about the slave's actions and dealings. 45 In in equal shares or in proportion to his share in the slave or in the merx peculiaris. As Julian's opinion is that each dominus may be sued for the full amount due to the creditor, Ulpian adds that "the person sued can recover part of what he is made to pay by an action on the partnership or for the division of property" (iudicium societatis vel communi dividundo). Cf. also D. 15.1.27.8 (Gai. 9 ad ed. prov.): "Nor will the defendant be harmed by being held liable, because if he pays more than his portion, he may recover the balance from his partner or partners by suing the partnership or bringing a divisory action", D. 14.3.14 (Paul. problem, due to the effects of a master's instructions to the slave for other masters of the same slave, and the concern of the law for such cases.
III.1.2 Agency problems between management and owners
A second set of agency problems could arise between the owner (or the owners) and their slave. In this case the slave (the agent) might have asymmetric information or take hidden actions 52 to his own benefit, thereby sometimes disregarding the owners' (principals') interests.
On the one hand, from a legal standpoint, the lack of awareness of slaves' business activities Several other texts 54 offer examples of (hidden) actions by the slave that could, absent legal 50 As we will examine, such risks were mitigated by the limited liability arising from the use of a peculium. 51 Paulus notes that creditors could act only against the authorizing master. If the authorization had been given by two masters, then both of them were jointly liable vis-à-vis creditors. 52 For both problems see the previous subsection and Section I . 53 It has been recently remarked that the control of the owner on slaves' activities and his liability towards creditors proportionally increased in case of voluntas, praepositio or iussum domini. Instead, the slave used the amount he borrowed for other purposes. Plausibly, the slave (ab)used the owner's position in order to credibly commit to repay or obtain more favorable conditions from the lender. The master could be personally liable towards the creditor for the benefit he should have received (but did not in fact receive) or, alternatively, the creditor could be exposed to a loss should the master not be held liable. Most clearly, harm to the masters could derive from theft committed or damage caused by slaves 56 or by activities in which underslaves engaged in. 57 Underslaves often benefitted from substantial autonomy, as we explain below. In turn, the possibility of such events and the difficulty encountered in monitoring slaves amounted to agency problems.
III.1.3 Agency problems within management
The management of businesses run by slaves endowed with a peculium could be organized as a hierarchical business structure, where the slave could acquire several underslaves (servi vicarii), who, in principle, could also have their own underslaves. 58 Therefore, within the management, agency problems could arise, with the upper layer of the organization being the principal of the lower layer. In D.14.4.5.1 (Ulp. 29 ad ed.), we have the case of a business hierarchically structured, with the different layers having different information about the activities of the underslave. 59 From this case it is clear that the underslave could be involved in business activities of which the slave 55 In this case, the fragment states that this additional liability should be imputed to the business assets (peculium) rather than to the owner's personal assets (ratio dominica 
III.2 Mitigating governance problems
The praetorian remedies offered various solutions to the agency problems emphasized above and, although unable to solve them completely, helped to reduce the impact of those problems that could not be addressed directly by the parties. Again, the Digesta offer several examples of this trend. We will first examine the posture of the praetorian remedies vis-à-vis agency problems among owners.
Then, we will analyze the solution provided by the edictal remedies to meet the needs generated by problems arising within the management. 65 In D. 14.1.5 (Paul. 29 ad ed.), an individual employed in his maritime business a servus alienus. In this case, the dominus servi was allowed to act with the actio exercitoria against the exercitornavis if a contract he had concluded with the slave was not honored. It is worth noting that the passage reports a case in which a master is allowed a remedy for dealings he had with his own slave in account of the economic nature of the transaction and of the asymmetric information and control powers between the master and the individual employing the slave. Doing otherwise would have inevitably exacerbated agency problems by allowing the managing party to generate negative externalities for the slave master. More broadly, this solution recognizes that a slave may be an agent of a different individual from his own master. The same solution applied to a co-owned slave whom only one of the masters employs in a maritime business. In cases, in which the common business was run by a slave not commonly owned (as in the example above), the available actions were the actionesex locato or ex conducto for onerous services and the actio mandati for gratuitous services. With regard to agency problems, the peculiarity of maritime business shows other cases relevant for our purpose. 66 (If a slave belonging to you and me in common has made a loan from his peculium, which belongs exclusively to you, he acquires the obligation for you, and even if he has stipulated for the same sum in my name, he will not release the debtor from his obligation. Each of us will have an action, I on the stipulation and you because it is your money that has been paid over; however, the debtor will be able to defeat me with the defense of fraud). 72 D. 14.4.1 pr. (Ulp. 29 ad ed.): One of the advantages of this edict is that it treats the master as an external creditor if he was aware that his slave was trading with the stock of the peculium, whereas in other cases he is privileged in respect of his slave's contracts, being liable only for what remains in the peculium after everything due to himself has been deducted. Thus, as considered in D. 14.4.3 pr. (Ulp. 29 ad ed.), the defendant sciens was subject to a deduction of all that is owed to the master who did not know. But if the suit was brought against the dominus ignorans, "it must be by way of the actio de peculio: so a full deduction must be made of anything owed to the master with knowledge, just as it would be if he himself had been sued on the peculium".
involving both slaves and underslaves managing a merx peculiaris.
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Against the master who knew that his underslaves were engaged in a trade, Ulpian holds that the appropriate remedy is the actio tributoria. By contrast, if the slave had knowledge of the underslave's trading, although the master did not, the suit should be brought against the master by way of actio de peculio. 74 Thereby, a softer liability regime is applied to a master who is less involved in the business.
Most likely agency problems arising with or within the management left fainter traces in the legal sources because slaves were not considered legal persons under Roman law and the use of force was a readily-available disciplining device. One exception is D.15.1.38.2 (Afric. 8 quaest.), which reports another case of a business hierarchically structured, addressing some of the agency problems arising within the management. Here the jurist examines a case where the slave was endowed with a peculium, including an underslave, whose value was double the amount owed to the master. Examining the possibility of a creditor's suit against the master, Africanus considers whether the master has to suffer a loss equal to the value of the underslave's debt. In principle, the liability of the owner under the actio de peculio was net of the credits he had with the slave-that is, for his credits towards the peculium, he had priority over other creditors. Instead, in this case, the jurist states that the whole value of the underslave should be taken into account without deducting his debt to the master according to the principle that "no one can be treated as forming part of his own peculium". From the slave's perspective, this solution shields him from over-indebtedness of his own underslave even in cases when they contracted debts with their common master.
Finally, from D.15.1.17 (Ulp. 29 ad ed.) results that creditors of the slave could seize assets pertaining to the peculium of the underslaves of the said slave, but, in contrast, creditors of an underslave could not seize assets pertaining to the slave's peculium (beyond the underslave's peculium).
III.3 Governance problems as a constraint
Governance problems within the business increased as the number of individuals involved 73 See A. Di Porto, Impresa collettiva e schiavo 'manager' in Roma antica (II sec. a.C. -II sec. d.C.) (1984), 307-330. 74 In this case, from the peculium of the underslave the master was allowed to deduct what was owed to him, but not what was owed to the slave. See T.J Chiusi, 'Contributo allo studio dell'editto de tributoria actione', Memorie dell'Accademia del Lincei 3(4) (1993), 382-384. Pomponius's advice quoted by Ulpian (29 ad ed.) in D.14.4.5.1 is that in case of knowledge of both the master and the slave, the dominus should be liable not only to an actio tributoria, but also to an actio de peculio, "the former in respect of the underslave, the latter in respect of the peculium of the slave"; debts due to the master and debts due to the slave "will both qualify for proportional deduction 'in respect of the merx'". With regard to the different case of the maritime trade cf. D. 14.1.22 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.).
increased. 75 Adding one additional individual to the business entity does not simply add one measure of monitoring costs. The total increase in monitoring is much larger, as every addition to the partnership imposes a monitoring cost (m) on all pre-existing partners. Each additional partner brings about a greater increase in monitoring costs, so that monitoring costs increase faster than the number of partners. A natural boundary on the size of ordinary businesses arises at the point where increasing marginal governance costs meet decreasing marginal returns to scale.
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What the optimal size of businesses was is a matter of empirical investigation that cannot possibly fall within the scope of this paper; however, in our example 77 , the balance of costs and benefits heavily depends on the baseline cost of monitoring m. The greater this cost, the smaller the optimal size of businesses. In turn, m can be seen as a proxy of the number and importance of agency problems that were not completely addressed by the law and were left to be solved by the masters themselves. Such residual governance problems can be easily identified in several cases described in the Digesta, which give important hints as to why masters had to monitor each other to a substantial extent.
A similar logic also applies to increases in size due to an increment at the bottom of the hierarchical structure of the business through the employment of underslaves. As in the case of several masters, the law does not perfectly shield from adverse effects and there remain agency problems to be solved. The activities of the underslave can have a potentially negative impact on the master's (or masters') position, even if liability is confined to the peculium. It is in the interest of the master and, to a large extent, also of the slave to assure that the capital invested in the peculium is not affected by business decisions taken by the underslaves. A slave endowed with a peculium could delegate certain activities to underslaves 78 or could rent the underslave's services to a third party; moreover, the underslaves could be engaged in dealings of their own D. 14.4.5.1 (Ulp.
75 Consider a simple example: with two owners, each owner needs to monitor what the other owner is doing. Assuming that the monitoring cost is equal to m, the total amount of monitoring going on among the owners will be equal to 2m (each owner monitors the other). With three owners, each owner needs to monitor two other owners, so that, in total, the amount of monitoring will be 3 times 2m, that is, 6m. Moving to four owners, each of them monitoring the other three, the amount of monitoring is 12m; with ten owners total monitoring costs rise to 90m, and so forth. Although this example does not carry any specific information about how business was done in practice, it nevertheless evidences important, stylized facts. As the example shows, adding one partner increases monitoring costs in a more-thanproportional fashion. Moving from two to three partners increases monitoring costs by 4m (from 2m to 6m), while moving from three to four partners increases monitoring costs by 6m (from 6m to 12m Economists have identified various mechanisms that keep the interests of the various participants in a business venture aligned, principally with reference to management and owners. 81 In particular, the market for corporate control, 82 the market for managerial services, 83 the financial market, 84 and the product market 85 have been advocated as forms of indirect control on management in modern corporations. The market for corporate control and a well-developed financial market were simply non-existent in ancient Rome. A market for managerial services existed to a certain extent only in the form of the slave market, which, however, cannot be compared to a modern labor market for managers. The product market did exercise a certain degree of control on managerial performance, especially by providing masters with imperfect but nevertheless valuable signals.
However, transportation costs and product perishability severely constrained trade both in size and in reach. Market discipline was certainly not enough to remove agency problems completely.
In addition, modern businesses rely on sophisticated forms of accounting, auditing and certification, so that information can be reliably transmitted from management to owners and potential investors or creditors. 86 Accounting in the Roman world between the second century BC and the second century AD was based on the recording of a limited amount of information concerning capital assets and (only marginally) income.
The main purpose of accounts (rationes) was to record events chronologically in terms of debts and credits per activity, 88 without a system of double-entry bookkeeping. 89 Moreover, there is no evidence of any statistical aggregation of data or certification by an independent agency. As a result, ancient accounting provided far less reliable information and could be used to convey information to third parties only to a limited extent.
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IV Limited access to credit IV.1 Limits to access to credit
Modern firms can finance their activities by means of equity-thereby extending the ownership base-or debt. We have already examined the agency problems generated by an expansion in the number of owners. Here we emphasize that agency problems may also have constrained the second source of finance for firms: debt. In the remainder of this section, we will analyze the agency problems that arose between the business and its creditors and emphasize that such problems may have curbed the ability of business managers to raise capital through debt where needed. 
IV.1.1 Agency problems between business and creditors
Evidence of agency problems between creditors and business could be inferred from the fact that the business-which, for the purposes of the model, can be seen as an agent of the creditors-could incur losses that, in case of insolvency, were externalized on creditors, a possibility that has been attested in the Digesta. 91 In addition, under the actio de peculio, the credits of the master had priority over other credits and hence had to be deducted from the peculio. Deductions could also occur as a result of more complex operations, such as when the slave promised to take over the liability of a debtor toward his master 92 or when the master promised to take over the liability of his slave. 93 Such deductions limited the amount that the creditors could seize and generated agency costs.
Other passages of the Digesta also evidence that payments made to the slave were part of the peculium unless the master had disposed otherwise, in which case they had to be deducted even if the master had debts toward the peculium. 94 Somewhat similarly, in case the slave had gone surety for a third party or had given guarantee for a debt, the creditor had an action against the peculium only if the slave had done so in the interest of the peculium. 95 Therefore, one may deduce that creditors were required to acquire a substantial amount of information in order to assess the solvency of the peculium.
Several other events could result in a detriment for the creditors. 96 In other cases, the creditor could have to split his suit between several defendants for the same credit if a slave was co-owned by several masters and endowed with a peculium or appointed to a common business. 97 Finally, the slave could in various ways transfer resources pertaining to the peculium into the personal assets of the owner, thereby causing a potential detriment to the creditors.
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Further problems could emerge from the hierarchical organization of the business. In D. The potential for conflicts among creditors is evidenced by the considerations made on the optimal choice of remedy (D.14.4.11, Gai. 9 ad ed. prov.). 102 It could happen that creditors had a choice between the actio de peculio and the actio tributoria, 103 in that the necessary conditions for the two actiones were partially overlapping. While the former allowed creditors to seize a larger set of assets, it obliged them to deduct the master's credits towards the slave from the active. In contrast, the latter remedy did not give priority to the master's credits (privilegium deductionis).
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In turn, the balance affected the total amount of debt to which the peculium (or the merx peculiaris) was exposed. Thus, it was crucial for a creditor to have a good picture of the total exposure of the peculium both in its entirety and concerning an individual merx peculiaris, before making a strategic choice of remedy. In turn, total exposure was a common-pool problem, with no creditor in a position to control or limit the amount of debt that a slave was contracting.
IV.2 Fostering access to credit
Given the chilling effect that agency problems may have on access to credit, the ius honorarium developed remedies designed to grapple with such problems. In economic terms, addressing the agency problems between business and creditors with respect to access to credit means increasing the probability of repayment, which in turn positively affects creditworthiness and improves businesses' ability to obtain credit.
A first step in this direction can be made by removing unnecessary procedural hurdles, which could make it more difficult for creditors to seize business assets in order to satisfy debt. In case of negotiationes per servos communes, in principle, unsatisfied creditors would have to sue all the coowners, so that doing business with a co-owned slave would have resulted in substantially higher ex post litigation costs for the creditors than doing business with a slave with only one master. This hurdle was removed by allowing creditors to sue one of the masters for the entire amount (under the actions institoria, exercitoria and de peculio) 106 and then let the co-owners deal with the internal apportionment of the losses. 107 Likewise, time could also be a confounding factor in account of the natural variability of business yields.
108
A second important feature of the rule fostering access to credit is the definition ex ante (before credit is extended) of the extent that the master would be liable ex post. Different remedies define different measures of the master's liability and it was crucial for the creditors to be able to anticipate under which remedy they could sue, should it be necessary. In turn, the choice of remedy was a function of the master's involvement in the slave's business. 109 In a nutshell, the larger the degree of the master's involvement, the broader the scope of his liability towards creditors.
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A third step in the direction of removing obstacles to access to credit is to prevent certain actions by the slave or the masters that would have hurt creditors and, consequently, to provide for 106 See D.14. 109 The sources describe this situation as "not being contrary to" (non nollere), "knowledge of" (scientia), "not objecting to" (non protestatur sit, "the master does not say to be against" (dominus non dicit se contra) the trading by the slave; D. 14.4. 118 and rules preventing the creditor from suing both the vendor and the purchaser at the same time. 119 More complex cases arise when either the vendor or the purchaser was a creditor of the slave prior to the sale. In general, the vendor could not sue the purchaser with an actio de peculio for such credits. 120 By barring such suits, this rule forced the vendor to reveal the entity of his credits to the purchaser prior to the sale so that the price could be adjusted and the debts could be deducted from the peculium. In contrast, the purchaser was allowed to sue the vendor with respect to previous dealings just like any other creditor could. 121 This possibility probably stemmed from the fact that the peculium was not necessarily transferred to the purchaser.
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A related set of rules concerns the actio de in rem verso. Ulpian (29 ad ed.) in D. 15.3.13 mentions conferrals of benefits (at the expense of the peculium) to one of the co-owners only. Such conferrals could be undone with an actio de in rem verso. The question arose if such actio was available only against the master who had received the benefit or also against a co-owner. Although in general the actio was thought to be available only against the master to whom the benefits had been conferred, 123 in some cases the actio could also be used against the other master. In this case, the defendant could reclaim from his partner what he had been held liable to pay.
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Not only could the slave confer peculium assets to his master, but the master could also fraudulently reduce the peculium by withdrawing assets from it, 125 in order to reduce his liability exposure. Creditors could then sue the master for fraud of the person with power. 126 Balancing the interests of creditors with the general advantages given by limited liability, the praetorian remedies protecting creditors found a natural limit in the need to protect the master from the a domino effect in bankruptcy in that he did not have to compute credits not yet paid in the peculium assets, on account of the fact that execution could be costly, uncertain and lengthy.
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So far we have focused on the legal solutions for agency problems between business and creditors, but praetorian remedies were also available to mitigate agency problems among creditors, mainly in respect of (potential) conflicts among creditors who tried to seize the same assets for the satisfaction of debt. The general principle seems to have been that, whenever possible, creditors should be allowed to rely on the assets more strictly related to the business to which they extended credit. As we have seen above 128 , Ulpian deals with cases in which a slave ran two different businesses with the same peculium. The principle expressed is that creditors of one business should be allowed to seize the assets pertaining to that activity prior to the creditors of the other business, and vice versa. The same principle applied to a business run in two different locations (D.14.4.5.16, Ulp. 29 ad ed.).The reason given in the latter text quite explicitly refers to the agency problems that we have identified: it is "fairest to have separate distributions; otherwise, some people might be able to satisfy themselves out of the assets of others and so shift their losses to them". requiring a guarantee from the satisfied creditor in order to protect other creditors coming forward later is a testimony to this effect. Moreover, the risk of bankruptcy borne by creditors increased with the amount lent to the business, to the effect that there was a natural limit to the size of loans.
Although the law tried to grapple with these problems, many unsolved issues remained, partially also due to the limits of the Roman accounting system, which we have already evidenced above.
Creditors could use two readily available ways to protect themselves from the risk of bankruptcy, beyond the protection afforded by the law. One way was to apply high interest rates in order to compensate for the high probability of default. A second strategy was to require secured credit in order to cover against the probability of default. Both strategies clearly reduced the ability 128 See above Section IV. of businesses to raise external capital, given to natural limits to the amount of interest a business could afford to pay and to the available assets that could be pledged as security. The result of these factors is a constraint on the size of businesses in terms of capital employed.
V Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the economic organization of slave-run businesses and showed that numerous problems discussed by Roman jurists-principally, by Ulpian in his commentary to the Edict-can be interpreted as agency problems. This analytical tool allows for a reexamination of the solutions proposed by the jurists and for the identification of a functional connection between these solutions and the goals of mitigating governance problems within the business and facilitating access to external finance. Despite these efforts, agency problems could not be completely removed and agency costs generated relevant diseconomies of scale, serving as a constraint to the growth of slave-run businesses both in terms of people involved and in terms of capital invested. These observations call for a rethinking of the notion of (optimal) size of Roman slave-run businesses. The evidence we analyze does not imply that the jurists were necessarily aware of the economic rationale of the solutions adopted. 132 However, further research could shed light on the degree of sophistication of the jurists' analytical tools.
